

Interim Government DECISIONS and ACTIONS in Relation to the Gen z–Government AGREEMENT



नेपाल राजपत्र

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खण्ड ७५) काठमाडौं, मंसिर २५ गते, २०८२ साल (अतिरिक्ताङ्क ३६

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नेपाल सरकार

प्रधानमन्त्री तथा मन्त्रिपरिषद्को कार्यालयको

सूचना

संवत् २०८२ साल मङ्सिर २४ गते जेन-जी जनआन्दोलनका प्रतिनिधि र नेपाल सरकारबीच भएको देहाय बमोजिमको सम्झौता नेपाल सरकारको निर्णय बमोजिम सर्वसाधारणको जानकारीको लागि प्रकाशन गरिएको छ।



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AGREEMENT**

**DEMOCRACY
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**Democracy Resource Center Nepal
Lalitpur**

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Acknowledgments

This analytical report focuses on the implementation status of the historic 10-point agreement reached between the Government of Nepal and representatives of the Gen Z movement on December 10, 2025. This study provides a structural evaluation of the policy measures, cabinet decisions, and administrative actions taken by the interim government, which was formed following the Gen Z movement on September 8 and 9, 2025, to fulfill the commitments of the agreement. The primary objective of this report is to objectively highlight the challenges of transitional governance, political priorities, and the progress as well as delays in the areas of good governance. Democracy Resource Center Nepal (DRCN) expresses its gratitude to the Gen Z movement activists, civil society members, political party representatives, and government officials who were interviewed for this study.

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Democracy Resource Center Nepal (DRCN)
Lalitpur, Nepal

Acronyms

APF	Armed Police Force
BS	Bikram Sambat
CBI	Central Bureau of Investigation
CIAA	Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority
CPN (UML)	Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist)
DAO	District Administration Office
DMLI	Department of Money Laundering Investigation
DRCN	Democracy Resource Center Nepal
ECC	Election Coordination Committee
ECN	Election Commission, Nepal
FPTP	First Past-The-Post
Gen Z	Generation Z
GIOMS	Government Integrated Office Management System
HoR	House of Representatives
MoCIT	Ministry of Communications and Information Technology
MoE	Ministry of Education
MoF	Ministry of Finance
MoFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MoHA	Ministry of Home Affairs
MoHP	Ministry of Health and Population
MoICS	Ministry of Industry, Commerce, and Supplies
NEA	Nepal Electricity Authority
NID	National Identity

NOTA	None of the Above
NPR	Nepalese Rupee
OCV/ODV	Out-of-Constituency Voting / Out-of-District Voting
OPMCM	Office of the Prime Minister and Council of Ministers
PAN	Permanent Account Number
PMO	Prime Minister's Office
PR	Proportional Representation
RPP	Rastriya Prajatantra Party
RSP	Rastriya Swatantra Party
ToR	Terms of Reference
UGC	University Grants Commission
USD	United States Dollar

Executive Summary

This report provides a structured assessment of the Interim Government’s progress in implementing the 10-point Gen Z–Government Agreement signed on December 10, 2025. The study covers the period from December 10, 2025, to March 10, 2026, and analyzes cabinet decisions and government actions in relation to the agreement’s commitments.

The agreement outlines a 10-point reform framework that functions both as a transitional accountability mechanism and a medium-term roadmap. Its provisions span multiple areas, reflecting an attempt to sequence justice, institutional reform, constitutional amendment, inclusive and participatory representation, accountable governance, transparency, and electoral reform within a single transition framework. The agreement also committed to ensuring the conduct of free and fair elections while advancing structural electoral reforms, including proposals such as the “None of the Above” (NOTA) ballot option.

Implementation varied considerably across different provisions of the agreement. On reparations and justice, the government adopted a dual approach that combined financial, medical, and employment-related support with symbolic recognition for martyrs, injured individuals, and their families. The High-Level Judicial Inquiry Commission was formed and completed its report, although the report was not officially released by this reporting period. Implementation of provisions related to ending policy and political corruption remained limited and uneven.

Rather than establishing new institutions envisioned under the agreement, the government largely relied on existing anti-corruption bodies and administrative mechanisms.

Free, fair, and peaceful elections were conducted successfully, but several major political and structural reforms remained largely unimplemented. These included proportional and inclusive candidate selection, internal party primaries, implementation of NOTA, and expanded voting rights for out-of-district and overseas Nepali citizens.

More visible progress was made in implementing provisions related to transparency and accountable governance. The government expanded digital governance systems, improved public access to official information, and introduced grievance-handling mechanisms. However, there were no publicly disclosed implementation measures to ensure fuller proportional inclusion and participatory representation in the mechanisms envisioned under the agreement. Provisions related to freedom of expression and digital freedom were only partially implemented, while the Terms of Reference (ToR) for the proposed Gen Z Council were finalized.

It is important to underline that the interim government operated under significant constraints, including a limited timeframe, absence of elected mandate, and restricted legislative authority. These constraints shaped both the pace and scope of implementation. Despite this, the government was able to make notable progress in implementing several operational provisions of the agreement.

Commitments that depended heavily on legislation, institutional restructuring, or parliamentary approval – such as asset disclosure measures and broader structural reforms – remained largely unimplemented due to structural and political barriers. By contrast, operational commitments that could be executed administratively without major legal reform saw more tangible progress. These included measures related to martyr recognition, reparations, and election administration.

At the same time, several operational commitments remained unfulfilled despite being administratively feasible and not requiring legislative approval, including receiving the Commission of Inquiry’s report and making it public. Commission-based commitments intended to provide the institutional backbone for the agreement also saw only limited progress, despite the fact that their initial establishment did not necessarily require new legislation.

Significant gaps therefore remain in operationalizing broader reforms related to inclusivity, proportional representation, depoliticization of public institutions, and the establishment of permanent accountability mechanisms. The implementation pattern suggests that the central challenge was not only one of legal or institutional limitation, but also one of political prioritization within a constrained governing window. In several cases, symbolic or procedural actions substituted for deeper implementation, including delays in issuing identity cards to injured and incomplete electoral reforms.

Three interconnected implementation dynamics emerge from this assessment. First, implementation progressed most clearly where commitments aligned with immediate administrative authority and electoral priorities. Second, partial progress occurred in areas requiring coordination, continuity, or moderate institutional effort. Third, non-implementation persisted in areas that required stronger political prioritization, legislative action, or new institutional arrangements.

These findings underscore the need for the newly elected government to take ownership of the agreement and pursue its implementation in a more comprehensive and sustained manner.

Recommendations

i. To the Elected Government

- Acknowledge the Gen Z movement and uphold the spirit of the agreement by prioritizing its key reform commitments. While the agreement does not create a formal legal obligation for the incoming government, it provides a politically salient reform framework. Where feasible, the government may also consider formal adoption or legislative incorporation of selected provisions through parliament.
- Establish an inter-ministerial coordination department within the Prime Minister’s Office to track the implementation of the Gen Z-Government agreement.
- Formally release the High-Level Judicial Inquiry Commission’s report on human rights violations and abuses committed during Nepal’s Gen Z protests in September 2025, submitted to the interim government on March 8, 2026.
- Strengthen the institutional framework responsible for investigating corruption and financial crimes, with a particular focus on ensuring operational independence, impartiality, and credibility.
- Engage relevant stakeholders on constitutional and legal reforms necessary to implement key provisions of the agreement, including NOTA, voting rights for citizens abroad, and greater proportional representation.

ii. To the Gen Z Groups

- Continue engaging political parties to ensure that agreement gains broader political ownership under the newly elected government.

- Continue monitoring implementation of the agreement on a point-by-point basis to ensure that commitments are upheld by both the interim and the elected governments.
- Work with political parties to secure their support for implementing the provisions of the agreement
- Coordinate with civil the society to build a broader accountability alliance that can monitor government actions and advocate for effective implementation of the agreement.

iii. To the Civil Societies

- Facilitate dialogue among government representatives, political parties, and Gen Z groups to build a shared understanding of transparency and accountability reforms.
- Form alliances with non-state actors, including Gen Z groups, to design and implement public awareness activities initiatives on transparency and accountability.
- Leverage these alliances to maintain public pressure on elected governments to uphold transparency and accountability in governance.

iv. To The Political Parties

- Ensure compliance with Election Commission rules and regulations on campaign financing.
- Comply with the Constitution and the Political Party Act 2017, and ensure that the party constitutions are democratic, inclusive, and meaningfully implemented.

- Engage constructively with the government, bureaucracy, civil society, and Gen Z groups to build public confidence in their commitment to transparency and accountability.
- Coordinate with these actors to support implementation of the Gen Z–Government Agreement.
- Publicly acknowledge the Gen Z–Government Agreement and encourage party members to support its implementation.

Introduction

This analytical report provides a detailed assessment of the interim government's progress in implementing the 10-point Gen Z–Government agreement. The objective of this study is to assess progress made by the interim government in implementing the agreement, signed on December 10, 2025, with groups representing the September Gen Z protests. It aims to identify enabling factors and barriers and examine how they have affected implementation. The study is intended to provide the interim and elected government with evidence-based insights to support implementation and promote transparency and accountability.

The Gen Z movement marks a significant turning point in Nepal's contemporary political history, bringing questions of governmental accountability, structural reform, and youth participation to the center of national debate. The agreement reached in this context represents not merely an attempt to address an immediate political crisis, but also a structural roadmap for long-term good governance and accountability. As such, an analysis of the implementation status of this agreement also reflects the nature and challenges of Nepal's transitional governance. This report has been prepared with the objective of objectively assessing the progress and limitations achieved during the interim government's tenure, while offering practical lessons and direction for the incoming government and other stakeholders.

Methodology

The study covered the period from December 10, 2025 to March 10, 2026, and examined progress made by the interim government toward implementation of the 10-point Gen Z-Government Agreement across two phases. The first phase spanned the first 100 days following the government's formation on September 12, 2025. The second phase covered the period from the signing of the agreement on December 10, 2025 through March 10, 2026.

The study analyzed 225 cabinet decisions made by the interim government and assesses their alignment with the Gen Z-Government Agreement. It also examined the roles of the interim government, bureaucracy, Gen Z groups, civil society, and political leaders in the implementation process. This report highlights institutional, political, social, and legislative factors influencing progress.

The research adopts a qualitative approach, drawing on desk research and analysis of secondary sources, including media reports, academic journals, and government ministry websites. Findings were triangulated and validated through in-person interviews with bureaucratic officials involved in implementing the agreement and with Gen Z representatives in Kathmandu. Documents reviewed include the Gen Z-Government Agreement, government directives, official statements, government website content, and relevant laws and policies. Media reports, press releases, and social media statements from key actors, including political leaders and

Gen Z representatives, were also monitored to capture developments, public reactions, and feedback.

The research adopted a qualitative approach, drawing on desk research and analysis of secondary sources, including media reports, academic journals, and official government websites. Findings were triangulated and verified through in-person interviews with bureaucratic officials involved in implementing the agreement and with Gen Z representatives in Kathmandu. Documents reviewed included the Gen Z–Government Agreement, government directives, official statements, government website content, and relevant laws and policies. Media reports, press releases, and social media statements from key actors, including political leaders and Gen Z representatives, were also monitored to capture developments, reactions, and feedback.

Gen Z Movement and the Gen Z-Government Agreement

a. Context of Gen Z Protest

On September 8, 2025, nationwide protests were led by demonstrators identifying as Gen Z, calling for an end to corruption and poor governance. The government's decision to ban 26 social media platforms served as an immediate catalyst for the Gen Z protests.¹ While the government justified the ban as a regulatory measure, it was widely perceived as a restriction on digital freedoms, triggering rapid youth mobilization. Although initially framed around digital rights and freedom of expression, the protests quickly expanded into a broader critique of governance failures, including corruption, patronage networks, elite privilege, and the structural exclusion of youth.²

The protests reflected accumulated discontent among young people, driven largely by the country's political situation. Youth unemployment, exceeding 20 percent, formed a significant socioeconomic backdrop, reinforcing the generational dimension of political dissatisfaction.³ The

¹ Onlinekhabar. 2025. Directive from the Telecommunications Authority to block 26 social media platforms, including Facebook (in Nepali). September 2025. Available at www.onlinekhabar.com/2025/09/1756780/nepal-telecommunications-authority-directs-to-block-26-social-media-platforms-including-facebook?; accessed on February 12, 2026.

² Interview with one of the Gen Z protesters on Dec 12, 2025.

³ The Kathmandu Post. 2024. Nepal's unemployment rate rises to 12.6 percent, survey says. June 6. Available at <https://kathmandupost.com/money/2024/06/16/nepal-s-unemployment-rate-rises-to-12-6-percent-survey-says>; accessed on January 3, 2026.

state's violent response on September 8 demonstrations resulted in fatalities and injuries⁴ and was followed by nationwide attacks on government and other institutions, triggering a broader legitimacy crisis.

Within twenty-four hours of the initial protests, mounting pressure led to the resignation of Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli.⁵ Following her nomination by Gen Z groups as their preferred candidate, Sushila Karki was appointed prime minister. Subsequently, on her recommendation, the President dissolved the House of Representative (HoR).

Karki's appointment – having previously served as the Chief Justice – represented an exercise in 'constitutional exceptionalism.' This was justified under the 'doctrine of necessity' rather than through conventional constitutional procedures.⁶ Networks associated with Gen Z played a visible role in advocating for this transition, marking a departure from conventional party-mediated leadership succession and signaling a temporary reconfiguration of political authority.⁷

b. Signing of the Gen Z–Government Agreement

The drafting of the Gen Z agreement was a prolonged process involving dialogue between youth alliances and the Prime Minister's Office (PMO). Following initial fragmentation, various Gen Z groups consolidated their

⁴ Human Rights Watch. 2025. Nepal: Illegal use of force during the Gen Z movement (in Nepali). November 19. Available at www.hrw.org/ne/news/2025/11/19/nepal-unlawful-use-of-force-during-gen-z-protest?; accessed on February 19, 2026.

⁵ The Kathmandu Post. 2025. Prime Minister Oli resigns amid deadly protests. September 9. Available at <https://kathmandupost.com/national/2025/09/09/prime-minister-oli-resigns-amid-deadly-protests> ; accessed on February 15, 2026.

⁶ Baral, Janardan. 2025. A citizen government will be provided based on the doctrine of necessity, not constitutional provisions (in Nepali). *Onlinekhabar*, September 9. Available at www.onlinekhabar.com/2025/09/1761130/civil-government-will-be-provided-by-the-principle-of-necessity-not-the-constitution ; accessed on February 15, 2026.

⁷ Interview with one of the Gen Z protesters on December 11, 2025.

demands into a unified proposal,⁸ shifting from protest slogans to a more structured reform agenda. The draft called for recognizing the protest as a ‘people’s movement’, reparations for victims, independent investigation into protest-related violence, and the establishment of mechanisms for constitutional and governance reform. Once submitted, the draft underwent bureaucratic and legal review, particularly concerning transitional justice provisions and the scope of constitutional reform authority.⁹

Prime Minister Karki directed officials to expedite finalization, however, tensions between political urgency and administrative caution slowed the process. Public commentary during this period highlighted concerns about bureaucratic delays and loss of momentum even before formal adoption.¹⁰ After months of negotiation and revision, a 10-point agreement was signed on December 10, 2025. The agreement recognized the uprising as a ‘people’s movement’, committed to investigating protest-related incidents, established reparative measures, and outlined pathways for constitutional reform.¹¹

Despite operating across multiple factions and loosely organized platforms, Gen Z leaders demonstrated sustained coordination and political persistence in securing a unified agreement with the state. Their shift from decentralized protest mobilization to structured negotiation represents a notable moment in Nepal’s recent political trajectory. The Gen Z–Government Agreement, emerging from a multi-stage dialogue that transformed street-level dissent into institutional bargaining, stands as

⁸ Interview with one of the Gen Z protesters on December 12, 2025.

⁹ Interview with one of the Gen Z protesters on December 12, 2025.

¹⁰ Kaphle, Kaushal. 2025. Why is the Gen Z–Government Agreement stuck even after the Prime Minister’s instructions? (in Nepali). *Onlinekhabar*, December 17. Available at www.onlinekhabar.com/2025/12/1819428/why-is-the-genji-government-agreement-stuck-even-after-the-prime-ministers-instructions; accessed on January 3, 2026.

¹¹ Mahara, Jay Singh, and Durga Dulal. 2025. 10-Point agreement between the government and Gen Z (in Nepali). *Kantipur*, December 11. Available at <https://ekantipur.com/news/2025/12/11/10-point-agreement-between-government-and-gen-g-13-31.html>; accessed on February 19, 2026.

a distinctive reform instrument centered on transparency, anti-corruption commitments, and accountability.

The inclusion of the families of those killed during the protests in the signing symbolized the integration of reparative justice into the state’s reform narrative. Publication of the agreement in the Nepal Gazette institutionalized the compact, transforming it from a political pledge into a formal instrument of governance.

However, the durability of the agreement remains uncertain. Some Gen Z factions have criticized the final text as insufficiently transformative, while legal petitions have challenged the interim government’s authority to make long-term political commitments.¹² The exclusion of established political parties from the drafting process has also raised questions about broader ownership and the continuity of implementation once normal political processes resume.¹³

c. An Overview of the Gen Z–Government Agreement

The 10-point Gen Z-Government Agreement, signed on December 10, 2025, was formalized by Bhoj Bikram Thapa, representing martyr families and the Gen Z movement, and Prime Minister Sushila Karki. Key groups present included the Gen Z Movement Alliance, Council of Gen Z, Gen Z Front, Hami Nepal, representatives of martyr families and the injured, as well as independent observers.¹⁴ The agreement outlines a 10-point

¹² Setopati. 2025. Writ filed in Supreme Court against the agreement between government and Gen Z (in Nepali). December 18. Available at www.setopati.com/politics/377125; accessed on February 15, 2026.

¹³ Interview with CPN (UML) leader Binda Pandey on December 30, 2025.

¹⁴ ANI. 2025. Gen Z and interim government of Nepal seal 10-point agreement amid rift within group. December 11. Available at www.aninews.in/news/world/asia/gen-z-and-interim-government-of-nepal-seal-10-point-agreement-amid-rift-within-group20251211011613; accessed on March 8, 2026.

reform framework that functions both as a transitional accountability mechanism and a medium-term structural reform roadmap.¹⁵ Its provisions cover multiple areas, reflecting an attempt to coherently align justice, institutional reform, and electoral preparation. The justice and reparations provisions seek to address the immediate legitimacy deficit arising from protest-related casualties. Measures such as the recognition of martyrs, provision of medical and social protection, and the establishment of a high-level judicial inquiry commission align with transitional justice principles centered on acknowledgment, investigation, and redress.¹⁶

Anti-corruption and institutional reform commitments aim to confront the systemic drivers of public distrust, including illicit wealth accumulation and the politicization of state institutions.¹⁷ Taken together, these measures are intended to restore institutional credibility and gradually rebuild state–society trust through targeted investigative and regulatory action. Electoral reform commitments, including preparations for the March 5, 2026, elections and proposed innovations such as NOTA option and internal party primaries, signal an effort at procedural integrity.¹⁸ By embedding reform within electoral process, the agreement connects accountability demands with the restoration of the representative constitutional order.

The constitutional review and youth representation provisions establish mechanisms for more structured and sustained participation, including the Constitutional Amendment Advisory Commission, and a Gen Z Council.¹⁹ These measures reflect an attempt to move beyond episodic

¹⁵ Agreement between the Representatives of the Gen Z People’s Movement and the Government of Nepal 2025.

¹⁶ Agreement between the Representatives of the Gen Z People’s Movement and the Government of Nepal 2025, Point 1 & 2.

¹⁷ Agreement between the Representatives of the Gen Z People’s Movement and the Government of Nepal 2025, Point 3.

¹⁸ Agreement between the Representatives of the Gen Z People’s Movement and the Government of Nepal 2025, Point 4.

¹⁹ Agreement between the Representatives of the Gen Z People’s Movement and the Government of Nepal 2025, Point 5 & 9.

mobilization toward institutionalized forms of engagement and oversight.²⁰ The agreement places transparency at the center of governance by requiring proactive disclosure of government decisions, expenditures, and administrative actions through accessible public platforms. It also mandates the publication of reports from previously established commissions investigating human rights violations, state violence, and corruption, reinforcing disclosure as a core accountability practice.²¹

Digital rights protections reaffirm freedom of expression to guard against arbitrary platform restrictions or surveillance.²² Given that digital regulation helped trigger the movement, this component carries both symbolic weight and practical significance, setting a clearer boundary for future executive conduct. Taken together, the agreement reflects what transitional governance literature describes as a sequencing dilemma: balancing immediate reparative actions, longer-term structural reforms, and a timely return to electoral normalcy.²³ The extent to which subsequent governments translate these commitments into practice will provide a basis for assessing whether the interim government’s actions result in meaningful reform, or just cautious stabilization.

The table below summarizes the key provisions of the 10-point agreement.

Provision	Details
1. Reparation, justice, and dignified memorialization	Recognition of martyrs, compensation, treatment, memorialization
1.1–1.2 Martyr recognition and support mechanisms	Formal recognition and long-term support

²⁰ Agreement between the Representatives of the Gen Z People’s Movement and the Government of Nepal 2025, Point 6.

²¹ Agreement between the Representatives of the Gen Z People’s Movement and the Government of Nepal 2025, Point 7.

²² Agreement between the Representatives of the Gen Z People’s Movement and the Government of Nepal 2025, Point 8.

²³ Haider, H. 2016. *Transitional justice: Topic Guide*. Birmingham, UK: GSDRC, University of Birmingham.

Provision	Details
1.3 Permanent integrity and good governance commission	Establishment of permanent accountability institution
2. Investigation and prosecution (Inquiry Commission)	Independent investigation and screening
2.2–2.4 Recommendation implementation and non-recurrence	Accountability actions and institutional reform
3. Ending political and policy-level corruption	De-politicization, asset scrutiny, quota-based appointments
3.1 High-level anti-corruption commission	Independent corruption investigation mechanism
4. Free, fair, peaceful elections (overall)	Prioritization of credible elections
4.1 Legal and institutional election arrangements	Legal reform to strengthen electoral credibility
4.2 Voter registration reform	Simplified, inclusive voter registration
4.3–4.4 Party finance and asset transparency	Mandatory disclosure; scrutiny; nationalization of assets with undisclosed income sources
4.5 Electoral system reform (NOTA, primaries, term limits)	Structural reforms to the electoral system
5. Improvements on the Constitution of Nepal	Constitutional review, amendment, federal structure, electoral system, inclusivity, proportionality,
5.1 Constitutional reform commission	Commission to review and recommend reforms
5.2 Preparation of reform report	Consultations at local, provincial and federal levels
5.3 Constitutional reform measures	Recommendation on amendments, inclusivity, proportionality, term limits, age limits, depoliticization of constitutional bodies, and party democratization

Provision	Details
6. Inclusive, proportional, and participatory representation	Ensuring inclusion and proportional representation in councils and commissions to be formed; Gen Z Council to play an advisory role
7. Transparency	Commitment to transparent and accountable governance
7.1-7.3 Accountable government	Fiscal transparency, public disclosure of government decisions; publication of reports on past human rights violations; measures to end nepotism and patronage in public appointments
8. Digital freedom and surveillance safeguards	Protection of expression and data privacy
9. Gen Z Council formation	Institutionalized youth engagement
10. Implementation of the Agreement	Implementation timeline and mutual accountability mechanisms

Alignment between the Interim Government's Actions and the Gen Z–Government Agreement

a. First 100 Days of the Interim Government's Actions

The Gen Z–Government Agreement was formally signed just a week before the interim government completed its first 100 days in office, its content largely reflected demands already articulated by Gen Z protesters before and immediately after the September protests.

The agreement did not introduce fundamentally new reform priorities, but it consolidated, refined, and expanded existing demands into a more structured governance framework. Over the course of negotiations, initially fragmented grievances—ranging from accountability for protest-related violence to anti-corruption reform and electoral restructuring—were translated into more institutionally grounded commitments. As such, any assessment of the government's first 100 days is inextricably linked to the agreement. Even before the official signing, many government decisions and actions anticipated and shaped the formal commitments that were eventually formalized.

During its first 100 days, the interim government adopted a dual approach, combining immediate symbolic and reparative measures to stabilize the post-protest environment with preparatory steps for political

transition through elections. The Cabinet held 14 meetings and issued 234 decisions during this period, reflecting a high level of executive activity within a compressed transitional window. Early decisions focused on recognition and redress. Forty-five protesters were declared martyrs, compensation was provided to affected families, free medical treatment for the injured was ensured, and a national day of mourning was declared. The establishment of the High-Level Judicial Inquiry Commission marked a formal institutional response to allegations of excessive force and human rights violations, signaling a shift from protest containment toward accountability-oriented governance. Through the agreement, Gen Z groups and the government further agreed to expand the commission's mandate.²⁴

At the structural level, the government-initiated efforts to reduce politicization and restore institutional independence, although outcomes remained uneven. For example, the interim government recalled 11 ambassadors appointed by the previous government.²⁵ However, only four resigned²⁶, and on November 2, 2025, the Supreme Court halted the decision.²⁷ Similarly, the Ministry of Education sought to remove the Prime Minister as Chancellor of Tribhuvan University by amending the law and introducing a bill to transfer the responsibility to someone selected by academics or the Board of Trustees. The dissolution of the HoR, however, stalled the bill's progress.

²⁴ Giri, Anil. 2025. Government, Gen Z leaders sign pending blueprint for reforms. *The Kathmandu Post*, December 11. Available at <https://kathmandupost.com/politics/2025/12/11/government-gen-z-leaders-sign-pending-blueprint-for-reforms>; accessed on March 8, 2026.

²⁵ The Kathmandu Post. 2025. Government recalls 11 Nepali ambassadors, including envoys to China and the US. October 16. Available at <https://kathmandupost.com/national/2025/10/16/government-recalls-11-nepali-ambassadors-including-envoys-to-china-and-the-us>; accessed on December 15, 2026 .

²⁶ Setopati. 2025. Four of 11 ambassadors recalled by Karki-led government resign. November 12. Available at <https://en.setopati.com/political/165421>; accessed on December 15, 2025.

²⁷ Setopati. 2025. SC issues interim order against government's decision to recall ambassadors. November 2. Available at <https://en.setopati.com/political/165374>; accessed on November 15, 2025.

On November 9, 2025, the Cabinet also decided to annul the *Land Problem Resolution Commission Formation Order, 2081*, along with all its district committees, citing concerns that it had been politically motivated.²⁸ This decision was later overturned by the Supreme Court, which found the dissolution unlawful.²⁹ These actions reflected government efforts to dismantle political corruption and policy distortions, and restore institutional autonomy through structural, legal, and procedural reforms, including early executive actions such as canceling party-led appointments and initiating university governance reform. However, judicial interventions, pending legal amendments, and the dissolution of the HoR limited progress and, in some cases reversed initial actions.

The Cabinet announced plans to establish a Constitutional Amendment Advisory Commission and a Gen Z Council, but neither body had materialized by the end of the 100-day period. Progress on transparency was more notable. Cabinet decisions were regularly published online, and financial disclosures improved. The government also made information on international assistance received through aid and loans public. For instance, on October 9, 2025, the cabinet decided to accept a USD 10 million grant from the World Bank-managed multi-donor trust fund for public management.³⁰ Similarly, on December 15, 2025, it approved a concessional loan of USD 100 million from the Asian Development Bank for strengthening public finance management and service delivery.³¹

²⁸ Government of Nepal. 2025. Decisions of the Council of Ministers meeting held on October 10, 2025 (in Nepali). October 10. Available at <https://mocit.gov.np/content/13094/development-of-the-council-of-ministers-held/>; accessed on November 15, 2025.

²⁹ Dulal, Durga. 2025. Government's decision to abolish the Land Commission is null and void (in Nepali). *Kantipur*, December 1. Available at <https://ekantipur.com/news/2025/12/01/governments-decision-to-abolish-the-land-commission-is-null-and-void-38-33.html>; accessed on December 15, 2025.

³⁰ Government of Nepal. 2025. Decisions of the Council of Ministers meeting held on October 10, 2025 (in Nepali). October 10. Available at <https://mocit.gov.np/content/13094/development-of-the-council-of-ministers-held/>; accessed on November 15, 2025.

³¹ Government of Nepal. 2025. Decisions of the Council of Ministers meetings held on December 11 and 15, 2025 (in Nepali). Available at www.mocit.gov.np/content/13119/cabinet-decision--aci--policy--20821----; accessed on December 15, 2025.

High-value transactions were increasingly routed through formal banking channels,³² and various austerity measures – including the abolition of 39 offices and 323 positions – were announced.³³

The interim government’s primary mandate remained the conduct of elections. It worked closely with the Election Commission of Nepal (ECN), amended voter registration rules to expand youth inclusion, and registered more than 915,000 new voters.³⁴ It also held consultations with major party leaders to build confidence around the March 5, 2026, election timeline.³⁵ Unresolved security concerns, primarily arising from thousands of escaped prisoners and unrecovered weapons following the September unrest, continued to pose risks to public confidence and electoral integrity.

Overall, the first 100 days reflected a government focused on stabilization and electoral transition. While there was some notable progress on accountability and procedural transparency, more substantive structural reforms remained pending, constrained by the limited mandate of an interim administration.

³² MyRepública. 2026. Nepal limits cash transactions above Rs. 500,000 to curb money laundering. January 17. Available at <https://myrepublica.nagariknetwork.com/news/nepal-limits-cash-transactions-above-rs-500000-to-curb-money-laundering-18-59.html>; accessed on March 8, 2026.

³³ A Cabinet meeting held on November 3, 2025 decided to close 39 offices, including 2 Medium-Level Offices, 1 Inland Revenue Office, and 36 Taxpayer Service Offices. As part of this restructuring under the MoF, the number of sanctioned Joint Secretary positions was reduced from 29 to 28, while Under Secretary positions decreased from 240 to 217. In addition, 68 Section Officer positions were eliminated. Overall, including the staff positions associated with the closed offices, a total of 323 posts have been abolished within the MoF.

³⁴ Election Commission Nepal. 2025. Publication of the Final Voter List (Press Release). December 27. Available at https://election.gov.np/admin/public//storage/HOR%202082/Press_Release_2082_09_12.jpg; accessed on March 8, 2026.

³⁵ Setopati. 2025. Prime Minister Karki holds discussions with Deuba, Oli, and Prachanda (in Nepali). December 27. Available at www.setopati.com/politics/377842; accessed on March 12, 2026.

b. Agreement Implementation Under the Interim Government

Between December 2025, and March 2026, the interim government held 14 Cabinet meetings and issued 225 decisions covering policy interventions, legal and administrative reforms, operational directives, and symbolic political acts. These included measures that continued to address the welfare needs of martyrs' families and those injured during the Gen Z movement, signaling a deliberate effort to institutionalize their benefits, recognize and memorialize their sacrifices, and sustain momentum toward elections.

The sections below assess the implementation status of each provision in the Gen Z-Government Agreement.

i. Reparation, Justice, and Dignified Memorialization of the Martyrs and the Injured

Beyond its initial 100 days, the interim government continued to focus on institutionalizing memories of the Gen Z protest and the sacrifices of the martyrs, and ensuring long-term access to state support for the injured. Efforts to provide compensation, identity documentation, healthcare, and educational, along with initiatives to commemorate the movement, suggested an effort to acknowledge the movement's political significance and establish its legacy. Although implementation gaps like delayed distribution of identity cards persisted, the overall policy direction reflected a continued commitment to addressing the concerns of martyrs' families and the injured within formal state systems.

The government maintained a dual approach, combining financial, employment-related, and medical support with symbolic recognition. It formed an inter-ministerial coordination committee to strengthen treatment and relief mechanisms for the injured and to oversee the establishment of a Gen Z memorial park. On February 3, 2026, the government approved the installation of martyrs' statues within the premises of the new Parliament

building at Singha Durbar, embedding the movement in the state's institutional memory.³⁶

In line with the agreement, the Cabinet meeting on February 5, 2026, approved the disbursement of NPR 11,90,28,000 through the Ministry of Finance (MoF) to the families of those who lost their lives during the Gen Z movement.³⁷ The government approved a monthly allowance of NPR 21,800 for the families of the martyrs, for a period of 10 years, alongside an additional 13th-month festival allowance provided annually.³⁸ First installment of NPR 7.1 million has since been transferred to the Martyrs' Family Welfare Society for distribution. Complementing these financial measures, the government initiated the issuance of martyr family identity cards, which were forwarded to the respective district administration offices (DAOs) on January 6, 2026, for distribution.³⁹

The government also continued implementation of its September 15, 2025, decision to provide free medical treatment and relief to the injured.⁴⁰ To streamline access, the government on January 28, 2026 issued separate identity cards for those injured during the movement, and distributed them to 73 DAOs.⁴¹ Injured individuals were categorized into four levels – critically severe, severe, moderate, and general – with corresponding

³⁶ Government of Nepal. 2026. Decisions of the Council of Ministers meetings held in the month of Magh, 2082 (in Nepali). March 25. Available at <https://opmcm.gov.np/content/495/decisions-of-the-council-of-ministers-meeting/> ; accessed on February 14, 2026.

³⁷ Government of Nepal. 2026. Decisions of the Council of Ministers meetings held in the month of Magh, 2082 (in Nepali). March 25. Available at <https://opmcm.gov.np/content/495/decisions-of-the-council-of-ministers-meeting/> ; accessed on February 14, 2026.

³⁸ Sharma, Bhuwan. 2025. Govt to pay Gen Z martyrs' families 10-year allowance in one go. *MyRepublica*, December 30. Available at <https://myrepublica.nagariknetwork.com/news/govt-to-pay-gen-z-martyrs-families-10-year-allowance-in-one-go-53-75.html>; accessed on February 25, 2026.

³⁹ Interview with the Joint Secretary at OPMCM on January 29, 2026.

⁴⁰ An officer at the MoHA reported that 2,599 injured individuals had received treatment at 21 hospitals nationwide between September 15, 2025, and January 29, 2026.

⁴¹ Interview with the Joint Secretary at OPMCM on January 29, 2026.

allowance budgets. As of the reporting period, identity cards had been distributed to 32 individuals.⁴²

According to a Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA) representative, financial assistance was provided through DAOs, including NPR 20,000 for incidental expenses and NPR 15,000 as immediate relief.⁴³ Beyond short-term assistance, the government also initiated measures for longer-term recovery. To support educational continuity, 63 injured individuals were recommended for scholarships through the University Grants Commission (UGC).⁴⁴ The government also designated 16 hospitals to establish dedicated Gen Z clinics, each with a focal point for long-term care. Virtual psychosocial counseling service were also made available to the injured and martyrs' families.⁴⁵

ii. Investigation and Prosecution of the September 2025 Protests and Institutional Reform to Prevent Future Violations

The interim government demonstrated procedural compliance with Provision 2 through establishment and operation of the High-Level Judicial Inquiry Commission. The Commission collected statements from relevant government officials and security actors, as well as testimonies from senior political leaders, contributing to a more comprehensive account of

⁴² Interview with the Joint Secretary at OPMCM on January 29, 2026.

⁴³ Interview with the authority at MoHA on January 29, 2026.

⁴⁴ Interview with the Joint Secretary at OPMCM on January 29, 2026.

⁴⁵ Interview with the Joint Secretary at OPMCM on January 29, 2026.

the events. Its tenure was extended multiple times,⁴⁶ and the report was submitted on March 8.⁴⁷

No clear decisions or implementation measures have been recorded for Provisions 2.3 and 2.4. The gap between agreed safeguards and enforcement practices, along with absence of action on these provisions, points to disconnect between formal commitments and implementation. Without tangible outcomes in these areas, the accountability process remained incomplete.

Under Provisions 2.1 (c) and 2.1(d), individuals under investigation for participating in the Gen Z movement – if not implicated in murder or serious offenses – were to be released from custody, and the government was to be advised to withdraw related cases. Despite this, by February 23, 2026, a total of 252 cases were filed in the Kathmandu District Court against individuals involved in the September 8 and 9 protests. As of January 29, 2026, an additional 123 cases were under investigation and expected to be brought to court by March 8, 2026.

A MoHA official noted that many of such cases had already been filed before the agreement was reached, making withdrawal legally complicated.⁴⁸ Reports also indicated inconsistencies in prosecutorial decisions. For instance, charges had been filed against individuals who documented their presence at protests, while cases had reportedly been dropped against those accused of setting fire to government buildings. Such

⁴⁶ MyRepública. 2026. Govt extends deadline for Gen Z movement probe commission by 25 days. February 10. Available at <https://myrepublica.nagariknetwork.com/news/govt-extends-deadline-for-gen-z-movement-probe-commission-by-25-days-22-13.html>; accessed on February 27, 2026. Government, by means of its decisions on January 20, 2026, and February 10, 2026, extended the Commission's tenure till March 6, 2026.

⁴⁷ The Kathmandu Post. 2026. Karki-led commission submits report on Gen Z uprising. March 8. Available at <https://kathmandupost.com/national/2026/03/08/karki-led-commission-submits-report>; accessed on March 9, 2026.

⁴⁸ Interview with Under Secretary at the MoHA on January 29, 2026.

inconsistencies risked reinforcing impunity, which the interim government had committed to tackling.⁴⁹

iii. Ending Political and Policy Corruption, Depoliticizing Public Institutions, and Abolishing Political Appointments

Implementation of Provision 3, which addresses ending political and policy corruption, the politicization of public institutions, and political patronage, has remained limited and uneven. While some modest administrative steps were taken under provision 3.1(d), key commitments related to political corruption, asset investigations, and institutional depoliticization did not advance beyond some procedural actions. Provision 3.1(c) requires scrutiny of the activities and finances of entities associated with public figures, including the nationalization of assets upon proof of wrongdoing. However, there were no concrete decisions or actions in this regard.

An official at the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) noted that, rather than establishing a new high-level commission, the government was focused on promoting and ensuring the independence of existing constitutional bodies to address corruption.⁵⁰ According to the official, institutions such as the Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority (CIAA) and the Department of Money Laundering Investigation (DMLI) had started acting more independently following the Gen Z movement. Provision 3.1(d) focuses on preventing corruption through governance reforms, including simplifying public services, improving access, strengthening grievance redress mechanisms, and promoting e-governance. In response,

⁴⁹ Basnet, Man Bahadur. 2026. Those who set fires at Singha Durbar and the Supreme Court will not be prosecuted; they are being released one after another on the instruction of the government prosecutor (in Nepali). *Ukaalo*, February 23, Available at www.ukaalo.com/news/32536/?utm; accessed on February 27, 2026.

⁵⁰ The official was in the coordination committee responsible for implementing the agreement between the Gen Z movement and the government. Interview with the Joint Secretary at OPMCM on January 29, 2026.

the government introduced grievance-handling mechanisms in each ministry and placed greater emphasis on digital governance to enhance transparency.⁵¹ On December 2, 2025, the government also decided that cash transactions above NRs. 500,000 must be conducted through banks or financial institutions to improve financial transparency.

iv. Ensuring Free, Fair, and Peaceful Elections

To operationalize Provision 4 – ensuring free, fair, peaceful, and fearless elections – the ECN, in coordination with relevant state institutions, undertook a range of administrative, regulatory, and security-related measures. Notable progress was made in procedural and administrative preparations, including voter registration, ballot printing, security deployment, and enforcement of the Election Code of Conduct. However, key political and structural reforms – including proportional and inclusive candidate selection, internal party primaries, the implementation of NOTA option, and expanded voting rights for out-of-district and overseas citizens – were not implemented.

Provision 4.1 emphasizes urgent legal, technical, and institutional preparations to ensure credible and accessible elections. From a regulatory perspective, the ECN enforced the Election Code of Conduct 2082, effective January 19, 2026.⁵² The Code introduced measures to enhance electoral transparency and accountability, including mandatory use of banking channels for campaign finance.⁵³ In response to emerging digital risks, the MoHA and the ECN engaged with social media platforms like

⁵¹ Government of Nepal. 2025. Decisions of the Council of Ministers meetings held in the month of Bhadra, 2082. Available at <https://opmcm.gov.np/content/472/decisions-of-the-council-of-ministers-in-bhadra/>; accessed on February 14, 2026.

⁵² Election Commission Nepal. 2025. Election Code of Conduct, 2082. Kathmandu: Election Commission Nepal. Available at <https://election.gov.np/admin/public/storage/HOR%202082/आचारसंहिता%20मस्यौदा%20Scan%20copy.pdf>; accessed on February 20, 2026.

⁵³ Election Commission Nepal. 2025. Election Code of Conduct, 2082. Kathmandu: Election Commission Nepal. Available at <https://election.gov.np/admin/public/>

TikTok to address election-related disinformation, illicit promotion, and online security threats.⁵⁴ The deployment of a specialized police unit to monitor cybercrime and social media misuse reflected growing recognition of the digital dimension of electoral integrity.

The Election Coordination Committee (ECC) also engaged provincial and local governments to facilitate smooth electoral operations. Under the Integrated Election Security Plan 2082, the government prepared to deploy 79,727 Nepal Army personnel one month before the election. An additional 34,576 Armed Police Force (APF) personnel and 75,797 Nepal Police personnel were deployed for the election. Nepal Police further recruited 133,980 and the APF recruited 15,110 temporary election police for deployment.⁵⁵

Provision 4.2 prioritizes streamlined voter registration. On November 13, 2025, the ECN began registering voters using existing National Identity (NID) number, significantly accelerating new registrations. However, legal gaps, constitutional constraints, political non-cooperation, and institutional limitations hindered efforts to expand inclusive electoral participation in. In particular, enabling voting rights for Nepali citizens residing abroad required legislative action, which was not possible following the dissolution of Parliament. While an ordinance was under consideration, the lack of a clear legal basis and indications that the Office of the President would not advance such a measure led the government to abandon this

storage/HOR%202082/आचारसंहिता%20मस्यौदा%20Scan%20copy.pdf ; accessed on February 20, 2026.

⁵⁴ Kantipur. 2026. Election-related message videos to appear as soon as TikTok is opened (in Nepali). February 4. Available at <https://ekantipur.com/news/2026/02/04/now-election-related-message-videos-will-appear-as-soon-as-you-open-tiktok-09-15.html>; accessed on February 20, 2026.

⁵⁵ The Kathmandu Post. 2025. President authorises army mobilisation for upcoming elections. November 28, Available at <https://kathmandupost.com/national/2025/11/28/president-authorises-army-mobilisation-for-upcoming-elections?utm;> accessed on February 27, 2026. This decision was approved and endorsed by the President on November 16, 2025.

option.⁵⁶ As a result, voters residing outside their electoral constituencies were also unable to vote.

The NOTA option also could not be included on the ballot as it required legislative amendment and political consensus, neither of which could be secured with the main legislative body dissolved.⁵⁷ A Gen Z leader involved in drafting the agreement expressed disappointment at its exclusion.⁵⁸ While seen by Gen Z leaders as a missed opportunity, international experience – such as in India – suggest that NOTA often remains symbolic, with hardly any impact on election outcomes. For NOTA to serve as an effective democratic instrument in Nepal, future legislation would need to define its functional consequences, moving beyond symbolism toward enforceable electoral implications.

Despite such legal challenges, some provisions were implemented through procedures introduced by the ECN within existing legal framework. On February 5, 2026, the ECN issued the Election Campaign Banking Account Operation and Management Procedure, 2082, requiring all campaign expenditures to be routed through the banking system.⁵⁹ In Mahottari district, DRCN researchers observed during direct field monitoring that candidates were required to use a verified bank account. However, only about half of all candidates had opened such an account and notified the commission. Provision 4.4 requires political parties to disclose financial details, face investigation, and have illicit or unexplained assets

⁵⁶ Onlinekhabar. 2026. Where did the inter-constituency voting plan get stuck? (in Nepali). January 15, Available at www.onlinekhabar.com/2026/01/1846546; accessed on February 27, 2026.

⁵⁷ Adhikari, Ramesh. 2025. NOTA in elections: How feasible is it? (in Nepali). *Kantipur*, November 25. Available at <https://ekantipur.com/opinion/2025/11/25/nota-in-elections-how-feasible-is-it-46-14.html>; accessed on February 27, 2026.

⁵⁸ DRCN’s discussion with Gen Z representatives on February 5, 2026.

⁵⁹ Provision 4.3 requires candidates to declare assets when filing nominations and mandates transparency in political and campaign finances. This provision had already been implemented procedurally from the 2022 elections under the Election Code of Conduct, 2022.

nationalized. As of the reporting period, the issue had not been taken up by the interim government.

Provision 4.5(b) mandates that political parties select candidates through internal primary elections. Without the ownership of the parties, this would not be feasible. For the March 5 elections, no political party used primary elections to select their candidates.⁶⁰ The selection of candidates through internal primary elections represents a shift toward a more democratic political culture, and its inclusion in the agreement signifies a major milestone in youth-led reform advocacy. While primaries represent an important shift toward internal party democracy – and had gained some visibility during the 2022 elections, led by the Rashtriya Swatantra Party (RSP) – their broader adoption remained limited. Their implementation would depend not only on legal requirements but also on political commitment from parties. Without this, even formal adoption risked becoming procedural rather than substantive.

Provision 4.5(c) states that the ECN will determine the ballot order of parties and candidates through a lottery. Instead, for the March 5 election, the order was determined by the share of proportional votes received in the 2022 election, and for the new parties, by date of registration.⁶¹

Provision 4.5(e) calls for legal measures to regulate opportunistic electoral coalitions. This, however, fell outside the direct authority of the interim government.⁶² Unlike in past elections, major parties did not

⁶⁰ Rastriya Swatantra Party carried out its primaries to select PR candidates. The party was heavily criticized for not adhering to its results, though.

⁶¹ Gurung, Sushil. 2026. The Election Commission publishes the voter list and adds new voters (in Nepali). *Shilapatra*, February 15. Available at <https://shilapatra.com/detail/176891>; accessed on February 27, 2026.

⁶² The Constitution of Nepal's Article 270 sets restrictions on imposition of prohibition on political parties and any such efforts is "deemed to be inconsistent with the Constitution and shall, *ipso facto*, be void."

form electoral alliances, although some parties contested under hared ballot symbols.⁶³

Provision 4.5(f) requires adherence to the principles of proportional and inclusive representation in candidate selection. This provision was not meaningfully implemented in the selection of candidates under either the FPTP or the proportional representation systems. Among the the FPTP candidates, 3,017 were men, 388 were women, and one candidate identified as “other”. Candidate selection was overwhelmingly male-dominated, with women accounting for only 11.39 percent. Representation of Dalit candidates remained similarly low, at 6.81 percent. Data analyzed by the Dignity Initiative showed that the candidate pool comprised 1,320 Khas Arya (38.76 percent), 813 Adivasi Janajati (23.87 percent), 778 Madhesi (22.84 percent), 141 Tharu (4.14 percent), and 122 Muslim candidates (3.58 percent). Among candidates from five major parties – Nepali Congress, NCP, CPN (UML), RPP, and RSP – Khas Arya dominance is even more pronounced, while women and Dalit candidates account for only 6.81 percent and 2.18 percent, respectively.⁶⁴ These patterns demonstrated that political parties remained non-committal to the provisions of proportional inclusion outlined in the Gen Z–Government agreement and enshrined in the Constitution.

v. Amendments to the Constitution of Nepal

On February 11, 2026, the committee formed by the Nepal Law Commission met with Prime Minister Karki to provide an update on progress in reviewing the Constitution. During the meeting, the Prime

⁶³ Interestingly, the Nepal Federal Socialist Party, the Bahujan Ekata Party Nepal, and the Nepal Janajagriti Party are contesting the election under the same symbol, ‘Bus.’ Similarly, Rastriya Mukti Party Nepal, Janata Samajwadi Party, and Nagarik Unmukti Party Nepal are competing under the same symbol, “*Chakiya (Jaato)*.”

⁶⁴ Bhatta, Kamal Raj. 2026. Widespread imbalance between population structure and FPTP candidacy – Khas Aryas dominate, Dalits are very few (in Nepali). *Naya Patrika*, January 24. Available at www.nayapatrikadaily.com/news-details/186978/2026-01-24; accessed January 25, 2026.

Minister advised the Commission to incorporate demands raised during the Gen Z movement into its recommendations, which were expected to provide a guide to the government formed after the March 5 elections.⁶⁵

vi. Inclusive, Participatory and Proportional Representation

There were no public disclosures of decisions or implementation measures to ensure proportional inclusion and participatory representation in the mechanisms envisioned in the Gen Z–Government Agreement. While these provisions are already guaranteed under the Constitution, implementation had remained weak. The interim cabinet, despite being the first in Nepal to be led by a female Prime Minister, also fell short on inclusion. In the cabinet formed after the Gen Z movement, representation of women, indigenous nationalities, Dalits, and Madhesis remained low, while there was no representation of Tharu and Muslim representation – an outcome that ran counter to the spirit of the agreement.

vii. Transparency

The interim government introduced new measures while also activating previously established institutional and technological systems to improve openness, accountability, and public access to state processes. On September 26, 2025, Finance Minister Rameshwor Khanal launched the Government Integrated Office Management System (GIOMS) designed to digitize document registration, correspondence, attendance, leave approvals, deputation, and records management, including the use of digital signatures. The interim government expected such digitization to improve transparency, accountability, cost efficiency, and decision-making

⁶⁵ Adhikari, Ashok. 2026. Constitution Amendment: The Law Commission has started a study (in Nepali). *Gorakhapatra*. February 11. Available at <https://gorkhapatraonline.com/news/191601>; accessed on February 27, 2026.

speed.⁶⁶ Since December 1, the Ministry of Industry, Commerce, and Supplies (MoICS) started implementing GIOMS in its service delivery. The system became operational three and a half years after the Cabinet approved a directive to provide government services through a unified electronic platform. The decision was first published in the Gazette on April 18, 2022.⁶⁷ The use of information technology also expanded within the MoHA and its line agencies.⁶⁸

On December 2, 2025, the government issued directives requiring cash transactions above NPR 500,000 to be conducted through banks or financial institutions.⁶⁹ The limit was set under Section 44G (1) of the Asset (Money) Laundering Prevention Act, 2064 (2008). The measure aimed to curb money laundering, reduce cash transactions, and promote digital payments.⁷⁰ Twelve categories of public services were integrated into the National Identity Card Management System,⁷¹ improving interoperability across government databases and reducing discretionary barriers to service

⁶⁶ The Kathmandu Post. 2025. Finance ministry rolls out integrated office management system. September 26. Available at <https://kathmandupost.com/national/2025/09/26/finance-ministry-rolls-out-integrated-office-management-system>; accessed on March 8, 2026.

⁶⁷ MyRepública. 2025. Industry Ministry to implement the Integrated Office Management System from December 1. November 23. Available at <https://myrepublica.nagariknetwork.com/news/industry-ministry-to-implement-integrated-office-management-system-from-dec-67-64.html>; accessed on March 8, 2026.

⁶⁸ Government of Nepal. 2025. Decisions of the Council of Ministers meetings held in the month of Bhadra, 2082 (in Nepali). Available at <https://opmcm.gov.np/content/495/decisions-of-the-council-of-ministers-meeting/>; accessed on February 14, 2026.

⁶⁹ Government of Nepal. 2025. Decisions of the Council of Ministers meetings held in the month of Mangsir, 2082 (in Nepali). Available at <https://opmcm.gov.np/content/475/decisions-of-the-council-of-ministers-in-mangsir-2082/>; accessed on February 14, 2026.

⁷⁰ Kantipur. 2025. Nepal Rastra Bank's directive to prohibit cash transactions exceeding Rs. 500,000 (in Nepali). December 22. Available at <https://ekantipur.com/business/2026/01/11/nepal-rastra-banks-directive-to-prohibit-cash-transactions-exceeding-rs-500000-08-33.html>; accessed on March 8, 2026.

⁷¹ The public services include: passport issuance, social security allowances, birth registration, transport management services, banks and financial institutions, Office of the Company Registrar (company registration and renewal), election-related services, pension management, foreign employment services, Nagarik App services, Permanent Account

access.⁷² Grievance-handling mechanisms were also strengthened at the OPMCM with a hotline, email, and designated contact points made publicly accessible.⁷³

Provision 7.2 requires that all inquiry and investigation reports on past human rights violations, violence, and corruption be made publicly accessible under existing law. The interim government did not follow through on this provision. Successive governments in Nepal have a history of withholding such reports, and it remained unclear if the interim government would repeat the pattern. For instance, the Lal Commission, formed on September 18, 2016, under the coordination of former justice Girishchandra Lal to investigate the events of the Madhesh and Tharuhat movements, completed its report after 14 months. However, despite sustained public demand, the report was never made public.⁷⁴

Under Provision 7.3, the interim government made information on the transfers and promotion of government employees, as well as approvals for foreign visits by public officials, publicly available through cabinet decisions and official websites, including those of OPMCM and the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology. However, this commitment was undermined when the Prime Minister's chief personal secretary appointed his own family members to positions within the PMO Secretariat, in direct contradiction to the agreement. The Prime Minister faced public criticism over these appointments and, on November 27, 2025,

Number (PAN) registration and, Social Security Fund services. It was launched before the Gen Z–government agreement to reduce costs and curb the misuse of state resources.

⁷² Interview with Under Secretary at the MoHA on January 29, 2026.

⁷³ Government of Nepal. 2025. Decisions of the Council of Ministers meetings held in the month of Bhadra, 2082 (in Nepali). Available at <https://opmcm.gov.np/content/495/decisions-of-the-council-of-ministers-meeting/>; accessed on February 14, 2026.

⁷⁴ Jha, Dipendra. 2023. Lal Commission report: Truth and lies. *The Kathmandu Post*, May 22. Available at <https://kathmandupost.com/columns/2023/05/22/lal-commission-report-truth-and-lies>; accessed on February 27, 2026.

dismissed 14 individuals from the Secretariat, including the concerned family member.⁷⁵

To address Provision 7.3, which calls for transparent selection processes for public offices to eliminate nepotism and discrimination, the government started preparing a national ‘Good Governance Blueprint’, as decided on December 29, 2025. To operationalize this mandate, the Prime Minister formed a 15-member high-level committee, comprising senior government officials, representatives of the Gen Z movement, private-sector, civil society, and thematic experts.⁷⁶ A joint secretary at the PMO stated the drafting process had been inclusive. However, Gen Z representatives consulted by DRCN said their inputs were not adequately reflected in the document. The committee was tasked with consolidating ministry-level inputs and policy recommendations and had started collecting sectoral feedback from government institutions. As part of this process, a high-level consultation workshop was held on January 27, 2026.⁷⁷ This was aimed at developing a shared understanding of governance reform priorities. The Gen Z leaders emphasized the need to clearly define ‘good governance’ and articulate how it would translate into tangible improvements in the daily lives of citizens.

The government continued to advance its digital governance agenda, building on its September 26, 2025, decision. As of January 28, 2026, a senior MoHA official reported that the use of information technology had expanded across various departments and line agencies, with a focus on service delivery improvements and administrative transparency.⁷⁸ While the interim government made notable progress in implementing

⁷⁵ Khabarhub. 2025. Nepal’s political parties gear up for election alliances. November 27. Available at <https://english.khabarhub.com/2025/27/507842/>; accessed on February 27, 2026.

⁷⁶ Bhatt, Suwas. 2026. New governance blueprint being prepared for the incoming government (in Nepali). *Naya Patrika*, January 29. Available at <https://www.nayapatrikadaily.com/news-details/187326/2026-01-29>; accessed on February 27, 2026.

⁷⁷ DRCN’s discussion with Gen Z representatives on February 5, 2026.

⁷⁸ Interview with the official on January 29, 2026.

Provision 7 – particularly in expanding digital systems, improving access to information, and establishing grievance mechanisms –several gaps remained. Legal, procedural, and technological reforms required to fully realize commitments on transparency had yet to be achieved. The interim government’s overall actions reflected partial alignment with the agreement, with improved procedural transparency and digital reforms, but deeper accountability measures remained only partially realized.

viii. Freedom of Expression and Digital Freedom

Of the two sub-points under this provision, only the one related to freedom of expression saw action, with the government taking a symbolic yet procedurally significant step in withdrawing the Social Media Bill (2081 BS) on February 3, 2026. The bill, which had been under review in the National Assembly during the previous administration, had attempted to regulate public use of social media.⁷⁹ The Bill’s withdrawal helped avert potential restrictions on freedom of expression, information flow, and digital communication. It also reduced concerns over unlawful surveillance or misuse of citizens’ data by the state or third parties. The sub-point related to protecting digital data from state or third-party misuse had not been implemented.

ix. Formation of the Gen Z Council

To advance the formation of the Gen Z Council under Provision 9, the interim government issued a public call for input on the Council’s Terms of Reference (ToR) on January 9, 2026.⁸⁰ By the end of the reporting period, the TOR had been finalized, and the Cabinet had decided to establish the

⁷⁹ Ratopati. 2026. National Assembly Unanimously Approves Withdrawal of Social Media Bill. February 9. February 9, Available at <https://english.ratopati.com/story/47650/decision-to-withdraw-social-media-bill-passed-unanimously?utm;> accessed on February 27, 2026.

⁸⁰ Setopati. 2026. Government to form Gen Z Council. February 24. Available at <https://en.setopati.com/political/165960;> accessed on February 27, 2026.

Council. Gen Z leaders raised concerns about the proposed hierarchical structure, arguing that it contradicted the movement’s original intent.⁸¹

x. Effective date and implementation of the Agreement

Provision 10 states that the agreement would come into effect from the date of signing and would be implemented through mutual consent between the interim government and the Gen Z representatives.

As highlighted in previous sections, despite some differences between the two sides, implementation had largely proceeded in a mutually agreed manner. The provision also allows for the possibility of additional agreements within the framework of the Gen Z-Government Agreement.

⁸¹ DRCN’s discussion with Gen Z representatives on February 5, 2026.

Ambition vs. Reality: A Layered Analysis of the Gen Z–Nepal Government Agreement

The implementation of the Gen Z–Government of Nepal agreement reveals a layered pattern across operational actions, commissions-based, and law-dependent commitments, shaped by structural constraints and political prioritization. Operational commitments were more or less about immediate actions that the government could take, without major structural or legal changes. Commissions based commitment was primarily about establishing mechanisms and commissions to address several reforms raised by the Gen Z movement and law dependent commitments require introducing laws and policies for structural and systemic changes. While the government operated within a limited timeframe and a transition-focused mandate—particularly in the absence of a functioning House of Representatives of Nepal—the outcomes suggest that implementation varied not only by feasibility but also by the level of political attention each theme received.

Operational commitments made the most tangible progress, particularly when they aligned with the government’s immediate mandate or could be implemented through existing administrative mechanisms. Provisions such as 1.1 Martyr Declaration, 1.2 Relief and Compensation (basic implementation), 4.1 Elections, and 4.2 Voter Registration (partial) were

carried forward, reflecting both urgency and administrative feasibility. A second tier of commitments—including expanded relief measures (health, education, jobs, meaningful memorialization), 3.1(d) e-governance reforms, 6.1 inclusion of Gen Z actors, and 7.1 transparency measures—was only partially implemented. In these cases, actions such as limited consultations with Gen Z representatives, incremental digitization of services, and selective public communication of decisions were initiated but not sustained or systematized.

At the same time, several operational commitments remained unimplemented despite being administratively feasible and not requiring legislative approval. These include 2.2 acting on inquiry findings, 2.3 ensuring no prosecution of protestors, 2.1 (a–d) detainee screening and release, and 7.2 making investigation reports public. These actions largely fell within executive authority and could have been pursued through directives, coordination with law enforcement and administrative bodies, or disclosure decisions. Their non-implementation, therefore, highlights a gap not of capacity or legal constraint but of prioritization within a limited governing window.

Commission-based commitments—intended to provide the institutional backbone of the agreement—were largely not implemented, with only partial progress in 1.2 Taskforce and 9.1 Gen Z Council. Other key provisions, including 1.3 Commission for Anti-Corruption, Good Governance, and Ending Impunity; 2.4 Security Reform Mechanism; 3.1 Political, Policy and Institutional Corruption Investigation Commission; and 5.1 Constitutional Reform Commission, were not established. While the full operationalization of these bodies would have required longer-term political commitment and, in some cases, legislative follow-up, their initial formation did not necessarily depend on new laws and could have been undertaken within the interim period. Establishing such commissions could have provided an institutional bridge between the interim administration and the elected government by generating recommendations, evidence,

and draft frameworks for reform. Their absence therefore limited the agreement’s ability to carry forward momentum into the post-election phase and weakened prospects for sustained oversight and coordinated reform.

Law-dependent commitments, in contrast, were largely unimplemented due to structural barriers. Provisions on asset disclosure (4.3), electoral reforms such as NOTA, primary elections, and term limits (4.5), regulation of OCV/ODV (4.2), asset nationalization (4.4), and digital freedom and data protection (8.1–8.2) required legislative action. However, with no sitting parliament and limited ordinance space—most of which was not used beyond essential electoral provisions—these commitments could not advance. This reflects the central constraint of the period: the inability to translate political agreements into binding legal frameworks.

Taken together, the agreement reflects three interrelated implementation dynamics. First, delivery occurred where commitments aligned with immediate administrative authority and electoral priorities. Second, partial progress emerged in areas requiring coordination, continuity, or moderate institutional effort. Third, non-implementation persisted in areas that required either political prioritization (despite feasibility) or structural enablers such as legislation and institutional formation. These gaps, however, should be understood within context. The government operated under significant constraints—time-bound authority, a dominant electoral mandate, and restricted legislative tools—which shaped both the scope and pace of implementation. The agreement thus reflects an ambitious reform effort whose outcomes were moderated by the practical realities of a transitional governance period.

Even accounting for these institutional constraints, the failure to establish the mandated commissions remains a critical missed opportunity. In comparative governance, such commissions serve as “anchoring institutions” that translate temporary political agreements into durable policy processes. By failing to proactively establish these bodies or to seek

creative ways to institutionalize the agreement, the government allowed the reform agenda to lose momentum. Without a dedicated institutional life of its own, the agreement was vulnerable to political inertia and bureaucratic drift, suggesting that while the obstacles were real, the government's efforts to navigate them were insufficient to uphold the spirit of the pact.

Factors Shaping Agreement Implementation

The section below outlines key factors that supported or hindered the implementation of the agreement’s provisions.

a. Factors Supporting the Implementation of the Agreement

1. Nature and Approach of the Interim Government

A key enabling factor of the agreement was the non-partisan nature of the interim government. This allowed it to act with relative independence, enabling quicker decision-making and implementation without the constraints of coalition bargaining or party consensus. This flexibility was evident in the swift formation of the High-Level Judicial Inquiry Commission on September 21, 2025,⁸² with state agencies mobilized quickly to support the Commission in recording statements and testimonies from relevant individuals. When additional time was required, the government extended the Commission’s mandate.⁸³

⁸² Government of Nepal. 2025. Decisions of the Council of Ministers meetings held in the month of Bhadra, 2082 (in Nepali). Available at <https://opmcm.gov.np/content/495/decisions-of-the-council-of-ministers-meeting/> ; accessed on February 14, 2026.

⁸³ Government of Nepal. 2026. Decisions of the Council of Ministers meetings held in the month of Magh, 2082 (in Nepali). Available at <https://opmcm.gov.np/content/495/decisions-of-the-council-of-ministers-meeting/> ; accessed on February 14, 2026.

The government's consultative and dialogue-based approach also supported implementation. Sustained engagement with Gen Z groups and political parties helped build trust and facilitated progress on key issues, including electoral commitments and the formation of Gen Z Council.

Through engagements with political parties, Prime Minister Sushila Karki was able to secure commitments from major actors including CPN (UML) and the Nepali Congress to participate in the March 5, 2026 elections. This followed an initial phase in which these parties had petitioned the Supreme Court to reinstate the dissolved HoR. The Prime Minister held multiple consultations with party leaders and former parliamentarians to build a consensus around an electoral roadmap for holding free, fair, and peaceful elections.⁸⁴ The interim government also held several rounds of discussions with political parties to secure support on implementing the Gen Z-Government Agreement, and to participate in the inquiry commission.

In the case of the Gen Z Council, the government's decision to seek public input on the ToR contributed to broader ownership and legitimacy, while helping reduce resistance through dialogue and participation. The interim government also reprioritized budget allocations to support reparations and electoral commitments under the agreement.⁸⁵

Strong leadership and inter-ministerial coordination further enabled implementation, in which the mobilization of bureaucracy also played a key role. Various ministries including the MoHA, the MoHP, and the MoF coordinated to implement the agreement's reparations provision efficiently.

⁸⁴ Akashvani News. 2025. Nepal PM Sushila Karki holds tripartite talks with political parties and Gen Z on 2026 elections. October 29. Available at www.newsonair.gov.in/nepal-pm-sushila-karki-holds-tripartite-talks-with-political-parties-and-gen-z-on-2026-elections/; accessed on March 8, 2026.

⁸⁵ The government reprioritized the budget and took measures to minimize the fiscal deficit by curbing unnecessary expenditures and promoting fiscal responsibility. Ultimately, the government saved NRs. 120 billion and allocated 19.15 billion for the March 5th elections. It was a remarkable achievement for the government to mobilize internal funds for the elections.

Specifically, the MoHA identified the injured, the MoHP ensured their treatment, and the MoHA arranged payments for these medical services. This coordinated response reflected a stability-driven interim approach, in which the bureaucracy rapidly operationalized decisions across multiple administrative levels, ensuring that relief and recognition reached intended beneficiaries effectively. This also demonstrated that inter-ministerial coordination, clearer procedural channels, and administrative capacity were vital in translating commitments from the Gen Z agreement into meaningful action.

Joint secretary-level staff actively participated in negotiating and drafting the provisions of the agreement. These officials mediated between both parties to foster a shared understanding of the compact. They led key committees, including the Injured and Martyrs Relief and Medical Treatment Coordination Committee, to institutionalize reparations, and the Committee to Develop a Good Governance Blueprint, to digitize public services, and ensure they were efficient, economical, transparent, and participatory.

2. Legislative and Policy Factors

The implementation of the Gen Z-Government Agreement relied primarily on existing legislative and policy frameworks, which enabled the government to respond to immediate needs without requiring extensive legal reform.⁸⁶ Key measures included the official designation of Bhadra 23 as Martyrs' Day, to be observed annually as a symbolic and political marker, and the planned construction of a Gen Z Memorial Park in Kathmandu. The government also made fiscal arrangements and released funds for reparations to the injured and martyrs' families.

⁸⁶ Article 21 of the Constitution of Nepal 2015, which establishes the rights of crime victims, and the Crime Victim Protection Act, 2018, provide an essential legal framework for the interim government to pursue its reparation efforts.

Implementation was further supported by prior research and policy recommendations, particularly in areas such as digital governance and financial transparency. Systems such as GIOMS, led by the MoFA and MoCIT, provided an institutional foundation.⁸⁷ Although GIOMS was officially launched on September 26, 2025 at the ministerial level, by the interim government, preparatory work had begun three years earlier. Its rollout GIOMS aimed to strengthen transparency and administrative accountability. Policies requiring cash transactions above NPR 500,000 to be conducted through formal banking channels enhanced financial transparency, while grievance-handling mechanisms improved responsiveness.⁸⁸ According to an official at the MoHA, the government was able to act quickly by drawing on existing laws and established administrative practices.⁸⁹

The appointment of Rameshore Khanal as the Finance Minister was also widely accepted as being significant. As a former Finance Secretary and Chair of the High-Level Economic Reform Advisory Commission, Khanal brought direct familiarity with prior reform recommendations on tax policy, public sector, and investment promotion. This positioned him to operationalize existing policy work rather than initiate reforms from scratch.

3. Sustained Public Pressure and Media Advocacy

Continuous media coverage and sustained pressure from Gen Z activists also served as an important enabling factor.⁹⁰ Public scrutiny helped

⁸⁷ Interview with Joint Secretary at OPMCM on January 29, 2026.

⁸⁸ Government of Nepal. 2025. Decisions of the Council of Ministers meetings held in the month of Bhadra, 2082 (in Nepali). Available at <https://opmcm.gov.np/content/495/decisions-of-the-council-of-ministers-meeting/>; accessed on February 14, 2026.

⁸⁹ Interview with the official on January 29, 2026.

⁹⁰ Kantipur. 2025. Calling the government directionless, 23 Gen Z groups demand the recall of the Prime Minister (in Nepali). November 20. Available at <https://ekantipur.com/news/2025/11/20/23-groups-of-genji-demand-recall-of-prime-minister-saying-government-is-directionless-52-36.html>; accessed on December 10, 2025.

maintain momentum, particularly in areas including declaration of martyrs and provision of relief.⁹¹ This combination of active civic engagement and sustained media attention reinforced accountability and responsiveness. Such citizen pressure accelerated decision-making, strengthened oversight, and supported administrative follow-through by drawing on past precedents and established bureaucratic mechanisms.

b. Barriers to the Implementation of the Agreement

While the above factors supported implementation, several constraints limited the interim government's ability to fully operationalize the agreement.

1. Interim Government's Time Constraints

It took nearly three months after its formation for the interim government to reach an agreement with Gen Z groups, which amounted to almost half of the government's tenure, which was set to conclude after the general election on March 5, 2026. This left only a limited window for implementation, insufficient to fully operationalize the agreement's provisions.

Although the government's primary mandate was always to conduct elections, preparations intensified following the issuance of the Integrated Election Security Plan 2082 on November 16, 2025. The government's focus shifted toward creating a conducive environment for elections, including political consultations, security planning, and other technical and administrative preparations. A joint secretary at the Agreement Implementation Committee within the OPMCM noted that the government prioritized completing the elections within the agreed timeframe and

⁹¹ Giri, Anil. 2025. Fallen Gen Z protesters declared martyrs. *The Kathmandu Post*, September 15. Available at <https://kathmandupost.com/national/2025/09/15/fallen-gen-z-protesters-declared-martyrs>; accessed on February 25, 2026.

transferring authority to an elected government.⁹² As a result, attention to implementation – particularly on structural reforms such as establishing a Constitutional Amendment Recommendation Commission – was constrained and, in some cases, deferred.

2. Challenges Posed by the Dissolution of HoR

In the absence of an elected HoR, the interim government was unable to pass legislation required to implement several provisions of the agreement. It therefore had to rely on ordinances, which required political consensus among key political actors, including the President, which proved difficult to secure.

In terms of elections, the government introduced only one ordinance on voter registration, which allowed many new voters to be registered before the election.⁹³ Other election-related provisions – such as introducing NOTA option, and enabling voting rights for Nepali citizens abroad – could not be implemented due to the absence of an active legislative body.⁹⁴

Efforts to depoliticize public institutions also faced constraints. A task force led by then-Education minister Mahabir Pun prepared the Integrated Higher Education Bill, which proposed removing the Prime Minister as Chancellor of Tribhuvan University and other public universities. However, the government was unable to introduce an ordinance despite Minister Pun’s sustained efforts. This represented a missed opportunity to address excessive political interference in Nepal’s public universities.

⁹² Interview with Joint Secretary at OPMCM on January 29, 2026.

⁹³ Awale, Sonia. 2025. Nepal PM expands her Cabinet. *Nepali Times*, September 21. Available at <https://nepalitimes.com/news/nepal-pm-set-to-expand-her-cabinet>; accessed on February 25, 2026.

⁹⁴ Government of Nepal. 2025. *Nepal Gazette, Part V: Notice of the Office of the Prime Minister and Council of Ministers*. Kathmandu: Government of Nepal. Available at <http://rajpatra.dop.gov.np/welcome/book?ref=26156>; accessed on January 2, 2026.

3. Coordination Challenges between Inexperienced Ministers and Bureaucrats

Prime Minister Karki appointed non-partisan ministers with limited or no prior political experience. A joint secretary at the OPMCM noted that the bureaucrats within the ministries faced difficulty in adjusting to and working with ministers who lacked prior experience in leadership roles.⁹⁵ These initial differences contributed to delays in finalizing the agreement and subsequently affecting the pace of implementation.

4. Political Party Hesitation to Endorse the Gen Z Movement

Political parties remained hesitant to fully endorse the Gen Z movement's agenda and showed limited support for key elements of the agreement, including the release of the Inquiry Commission's report. At the outset, senior political leaders, including the former Prime Minister and the Home Minister, were reluctant to cooperate with the Commission's request for recorded testimonies, although they eventually complied. Despite efforts by Gen Z groups to engage political parties through closed-room consultations and multi-stakeholder dialogues, the agreement was ultimately signed without their formal participation.⁹⁶ As a result, political parties were yet to take ownership of the agreement or formally recognize it.⁹⁷

A Gen Z leader noted that efforts were made to include political parties in the drafting and the signing process, but those did not materialize.⁹⁸ Their absence continued to affect implementation, particularly in areas requiring political buy-in, such as NOTA, out-of-constituency voting, and internal party primaries.

⁹⁵ Interview with Joint Secretary at OPMCM on January 29, 2026.

⁹⁶ Interview with Gen Z Representative on March 4, 2026.

⁹⁷ MyRepública. 2025. Agreement or appeasement? December 12. Available at <https://myrepublica.nagariknetwork.com/news/agreement-or-appeasement-21-70.html>; accessed on February 25, 2026.

⁹⁸ Interview with Gen Z Representative on March 4, 2026.

5. Budget Reprioritization and Delayed Compensation Payment

Financial constraints also affected implementation. The MoHA did not have pre-allocated budgets for key commitments, including prosthetic support for injured individuals and broader compensation and relief measures. As a result, funds had to be reprioritized from other ministries, a process that took time and delayed disbursements. According to an official at the MoHA, these delays affected the timely delivery of compensation, treatment support, and rehabilitation assistance.⁹⁹ Frustration over delays led injured individuals and families of martyrs to stage protests outside Singha Durbar, highlighting gaps between commitments and delivery.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁹ Interview with the official at MoHA on January 29, 2026.

¹⁰⁰ Khabarhub. 2026. Gen Z injured protesters, families of martyr's stage sit-in at PM's Office. January 16. Available at <https://english.khabarhub.com/2026/16/516292/>; accessed on February 25, 2026.

Conclusion

The interim government took significant steps toward implementing key provisions of the Gen Z–Government Agreement, particularly in relation to reparations for martyrs and the injured, election management, digital governance, and transparency measures. Procedural and institutional initiatives, including the High-Level Judicial Inquiry Commission, grievance redress systems, digital service integration, and public consultations, partially aligned with the agreement’s broader objectives. The interim government also devoted considerable attention and administrative effort to conducting the March 5, 2026, elections.

However, major gaps remained in implementing broader reforms, including commitments related to inclusivity, proportional representation, the depoliticization of public institutions, and the establishment of permanent accountability commissions. The interim government’s limited timeframe and the absence of an elected HoR constrained its ability to pursue deeper institutional reform through legislative amendment. Several provisions of the agreement required legal enactment, parliamentary approval, or broader political consensus that the interim government alone could not secure.

In some areas, symbolic or procedural actions substituted for substantive implementation. Delays in issuance of identity cards, incomplete electoral reforms, and the appointments of family members within the Prime Minister’s Secretariat, despite commitments to transparency, illustrated the

gap between commitments and implementation. Actions related to freedom of expression, digital safeguards, and the proposed Gen Z Council remained largely preliminary or consultative, without meaningful institutionalization. In several instances, reforms that could have been implemented within the interim government's mandate were either delayed or only partially pursued. These shortcomings underscore the importance of the newly elected government taking ownership of the agreement and advancing its implementation in a more sustained and comprehensive manner.¹⁰¹

¹⁰¹ See Annex I for a tabular representation of implementation status.

Recommendations

1. To the Elected Government

- Acknowledge the Gen Z movement and uphold the spirit of the agreement by prioritizing its key reform commitments. While the agreement does not create a formal legal obligation for the elected government, it provides a politically salient reform framework. Where feasible, the government may also consider formal adoption or legislative incorporation of selected provisions through parliament.
- Establish an inter-ministerial coordination department within the Prime Minister’s Office to track the implementation of the Gen Z-Government agreement.
- Formally release the High-Level Judicial Inquiry Commission’s report on human rights violations and abuses committed during Nepal’s Gen Z protests in September 2025, submitted to the interim government on March 8, 2026.
- Strengthen the independence, credibility and neutrality of the Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority (CIAA) and the Department of Money Laundering Investigation (DMLI)
- Engage relevant stakeholders on constitutional and legal reforms necessary to implement key provisions of the agreement, including

NOTA, voting rights for citizens abroad, and greater proportional representation.

2. To the Gen Z Groups

- Continue engaging political parties to ensure that agreement gains broader political ownership under the newly elected government.
- Continue monitoring implementation of the agreement on a point-by-point basis to ensure that commitments are upheld by both the interim and the elected governments.
- Work with political parties to secure their support for implementing the provisions of the agreement
- Coordinate with civil the society to build a broader accountability alliance that can monitor government actions and advocate for effective implementation of the agreement.

3. To the Civil Societies

- Facilitate dialogue among government representatives, political parties, and Gen Z groups to build a shared understanding of transparency and accountability reforms.
- Form alliances with non-state actors, including Gen Z groups, to design and implement public awareness activities initiatives on transparency and accountability.
- Leverage these alliances to maintain public pressure on both interim and elected governments to uphold transparency and accountability in governance.

4. To The Political Parties

- Ensure compliance with Election Commission rules and regulations on campaign financing.
- Comply with the Constitution and the Political Party Act 2017, and ensure that the party constitutions are democratic, inclusive, and meaningfully implemented.
- Engage constructively with the government, bureaucracy, civil society, and Gen Z groups to build public confidence in their commitment to transparency and accountability.
- Coordinate with these actors to support implementation of the Gen Z–Government Agreement.
- Publicly acknowledge the Gen Z–Government Agreement and encourage party members to support its implementation.

Annex

Annex 1: Implementation Status of the Agreement between Gen Z Movement and Government of Nepal

S.N.	Main Point of Agreement	Sub-Point	Action Required to Implement	Implementation Status	Status as of March 10, 2026	Remarks
1	Respect, justice, and reparations for martyrs and the injured	1.1 Declaring martyrs of the Gen Z movement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Declare martyrs • Address family demands 	Full	Government declared martyrs; Continued addressing of family demands	
		1.2 Addressing short/long-term needs of families and injured	1. High-level task force	Partial	Coordination committee formed under MoHA	Had limited decision-making power and was largely symbolic under the interim government.
			2. Interim relief	Full	Rs. 35,000 provided in two installments	
			3. Compensation	Full	Rs. 1.5 million provided to each of the 53 families including 45 martyr families	

S.N.	Main Point of Agreement	Sub-Point	Action Required to Implement	Implementation Status	Status as of March 10, 2026	Remarks
			4. Free health & counseling	Partial	Free treatment for 2,599 injured; 183 still in treatment; 'Gen Z Clinics' in 16 hospitals	The categorization of 'injured' vs. 'severely injured' is unclear and appears arbitrary; complaints continued to pile up.
			5. Free education	Partial	63 injured persons recommended to UGC for scholarships	
			6. Employment	Partial	Help desk at Labor Ministry; 27 families employed by NEA	
			7. Social Security	Full	Rs. 119 million grants to Martyr Society; Monthly allowance of Rs. 21,800 for 10 years	7.1 million was transferred to Gen Z Martyrs' Family Welfare Society

S.N.	Main Point of Agreement	Sub-Point	Action Required to Implement	Implementation Status	Status as of March 10, 2026	Remarks
			8. Memorialization	Partial	Decision to place statues of Gen Z martyrs in the new Parliament building	
		1.3 Permanent commission for good governance/ anti-corruption	1. Form Commission	Not at all		Government focused on strengthening CIAA and DMLI instead of a new body
2	Institutional reforms to prevent recurrence & investigation	2.1 Extending mandate of Inquiry Commission	1. Extend Mandate	Full	Mandate extended by Cabinet on Sept 22, 2025	
		Recommendation for criminal accountability	1. Fact-finding 2. Recommend prosecution	Not at all		Report submitted to govt but not made public; no action initiated against the accused

S.N.	Main Point of Agreement	Sub-Point	Action Required to Implement	Implementation Status	Status as of March 10, 2026	Remarks
		Investigating criminal vs. political violence		Not at all		
		Screening and investigation of detainees within 15 days	1. Hotline/Online complaints 2. Screening of details	Not at all	955 arrested; only 510 had cases registered against them	Protester arrests continued; the interim-era commission had rejected the added ToR as unconstitutional and conducive to impunity.
		Release of those not involved in serious organized crime	1. Identification 2. Recommendation for release	Not at all	Report and recommendations not yet implemented/public	
		2.2 Immediate action based on report		Not at all	No decision made on the recommendations	

S.N.	Main Point of Agreement	Sub-Point	Action Required to Implement	Implementation Status	Status as of March 10, 2026	Remarks
		2.3 No prosecution for political protest participation		Not at all		
		2.4 Mechanism for security sector reform		Not at all	Mechanism not formed	
3	Ending political corruption and partisan appointments	3.1 High-level commission to investigate corruption/corruption/partisanship	1. Form Commission	Not at all		Government used existing bodies like CIAA instead
		a) Investigate lifestyle/assets of public officials		Not at all		No commission, no investigation
		b) End partisan appointments in public institutions		Not at all		Efforts by MoE failed due to lack of Parliament/ Ordinance

S.N.	Main Point of Agreement	Sub-Point	Action Required to Implement	Implementation Status	Status as of March 10, 2026	Remarks
		c) Investigate/ Nationalize assets of political trusts/ foundations		Not at all	No investigation conducted	
		d) Simplify service delivery/ E-governance		Partial	Good Governance Blueprint in final stages	
4	Ensuring free, fair, and fearless elections	4.1 Legal and technical infrastructure for elections		Full	Elections completed peacefully; updated code of conduct; cyber police deployed.	
		4.2 Ease of voter registration and voting for migrants	1. Registration drive	Full	Law amended via ordinance; linked with NID; registration deadline extended.	
			2. Voting from current location/ abroad	Not at all		Failed due to lack of Parliament and political consensus.

S.N.	Main Point of Agreement	Sub-Point	Action Required to Implement	Implementation Status	Status as of March 10, 2026	Remarks
		4.3 Transparency in candidate assets/spending		Partial	Mandatory bank accounts for election spending enforced by ECN.	
		4.4 Nationalizing unexplained political party assets		Not at all		No laws enacted due to absence of Parliament
		4.5 Electoral System Reforms (NOTA, Primary elections, etc.)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) NOTA (None of the Above) b) Primary Elections c) Lottery for ballot order d) Two-term limit for Party Chiefs e) Curbing unhealthy alliances f) Inclusive PR in FPTP 	Not at all		These reforms required legislative action and could not be implemented due to Parliament's absence and lack of consensus among major parties.

S.N.	Main Point of Agreement	Sub-Point	Action Required to Implement	Implementation Status	Status as of March 10, 2026	Remarks
5	Constitutional Reforms		Form High-level Suggestion Commission	Not at all		Commission not formed; no progress on sub-points
6	Proportional Inclusivity	6.1 Inclusive representation in all mechanisms	Role of Gen Z Council	Partial	Government prioritized Gen Z participation in various newly formed mechanisms.	
7	Transparency	7.1 Transparency in govt decisions/spending 7.2 Making past investigation reports public		Partial	Cabinet and Ministry decisions made public via websites/social media.	Doubts remained as even the most recent reports had not been released
		7.3 Transparent selection for public posts		Partial	Regular appointment such as Chief of Police, CBI were not controversial.	PM Karki's secretariat appointment was called out for not being transparent.

S.N.	Main Point of Agreement	Sub-Point	Action Required to Implement	Implementation Status	Status as of March 10, 2026	Remarks
8	Digital Freedom	8.1 Preventing illegal censorship/regulation 8.2 Protecting digital data from state/third-party misuse		Partial Not at all	Government withdrew the controversial Social Media Bill 2024 from Parliament. No infrastructure or legal reform yet	
9	Formation of Gen Z Council	9.1 Form Council for governance advice/oversight		Partial	The Council of Ministers (Cabinet) had officially decided to form the Gen Z Council. Progress on ToR: The ToR for the Gen Z Council had already been drafted.	

Annex II: Agreement between the Representatives of the Gen Z People’s Movement and the Government of Nepal

Preamble

Acknowledging that the failure to meaningfully address conflicts emanating from systemic issues such as corruption, lack of good governance, impunity, discrimination, exclusion, and socio-economic disparity and injustice, and subsequent public frustration led to the politico-social people's movement led by the Gen Z of September 8 and 9, 2025,

Honouring the martyrs who sacrificed their lives during the people’s movement, as well as the injured and all their family members,

Expressing despair over the irreparable human, social, psychological, physical, economic, and all forms of losses caused during the people’s movement,

Recognising the imperative need to end impunity by conducting an independent investigation into all grave human rights violations and acts of violence that occurred during the people's movement by ensuring truth, justice, reparations, and institutional reforms,

Accepting the historic fact that the extraordinary circumstances surrounding the Gen Z-led people’s movement required the establishment of a nonpartisan, transparent, accountable, inclusive, and competent interim civilian government, the dissolution of the House of Representatives, which had lost public trust, and necessitated the scheduling of elections for a new House of Representatives,

Reinforcing the relevance and legitimacy of the Constitution of Nepal, promulgated by the Nepali people through the Constituent Assembly, which ascertains the right to live with dignity, right to freedom of expression and freedom of assembly, federal republic democracy, secularism, proportionally inclusive state structures based on the principle

of equality, and social and economic justice, obtained through various periodic people's movements, armed resistances, women's movements, Madheshi movements, Indigenous movements, Dalit movements, Muslim movements, and Tharuhat movements, among others,

Emphasising the legitimacy of the digital media used by the Nepali as a medium of civic expression and recognising new digital media, cultural symbols and creative expressions used in this movement as legitimate forms of civic political engagement,

Resolving to eliminate class, ethnicity, gender and sexuality-based inequities created by social, political, religious, cultural, and structural discrimination, and economic exploitation,

Reaffirming the necessity to ensure just access of every Nepali citizen to resources, and the equitable distribution, allocation and sustainable use of resources,

Strongly emphasising the need for state policies and programs to prioritise education, health, employment, housing, land, language, culture, gender and collective rights, as well as entrepreneurship, innovation and research, through the strengthening of federalism, local autonomy and decentralisation guided by the principles of good governance, inclusion, and public participation,

Pledging that reconstruction efforts after the people's movement will be corruption-free, transparent, accountable, efficient, economical, inclusive, effective and free from conflicts of interest through the operationalisation of the principle of good governance,

Deeply inspired by the indomitable aspiration of the Nepali people for good governance, by adopting the mandate obtained through the people's movement led by Gen Z and the values and norms enshrined in the Constitution, the Government of Nepal and the representatives of the Gen Z people's movement have concluded this Agreement. Both parties

solemnly pledge to implement the provisions of this Agreement faithfully and effectively.

1. Recognition, justice, reparation and meaningful memorialization of the sacrifice of the martyrs and the injured

- 1.1. The Government of Nepal will recognise those martyred as a result of the repression and widespread violence of the former government during the people’s movement led by Gen Z on September 8 and 9, 2025, as martyrs, and immediately address the demands and needs of the families of martyrs.
- 1.2. The Government of Nepal will immediately form a high-level working committee in consultation and coordination with the concerned martyrs’ families and the injured to address the immediate and long-term needs of the martyrs’ families and injured persons. The working committee will ensure the delivery of reparative measures, including interim relief, compensation, free medical treatment and psychosocial counselling, free education, employment, social security and meaningful memorialization.
- 1.3. In accordance with the collective demands of the martyrs’ families and the injured of the Gen Z movement, the Government of Nepal will form an independent permanent commission to instil integrity and good governance, prevent corruption, and end impunity.

2. Investigation, prosecution of the incidents of September 8 and 9, 2025 and institutional reforms to prevent recurrence

- 2.1. The Government of Nepal will add the following mandates to the inquiry commission formed in relation to the incidents of September 8 and 9, 2025:

- a. To impartially investigate allegations of human rights violations, including extrajudicial killings, resulting from the excessive use of force during the people's movement, engage in truth-finding, and recommend criminal accountability as subsequently required.
- b. Taking into account the principles of investigation, truth-seeking and reconciliation, and adopting appropriate procedures, to investigate and present a recommendatory report that, without prejudice, distinguishes between events that occurred during the people's movement and violent acts committed with criminal intent in a coordinated and organized manner by other persons or groups, considering the nature of the movement and the specific situational circumstances of September 8 and 9, 2025.
- c. No one shall be subject to investigation or prosecution for merely participating in the movement. If any person has been subjected to investigation or prosecution, such person, or any other individual on behalf of such person, may file an online, written or hotline complaint. Upon receiving such a complaint, the commission shall retrieve relevant details from the concerned authority, conduct screening and investigation within 15 days from the date this Agreement enters into effect.
- d. If upon screening and investigating a complaint, the commission does not find that the person was involved in serious criminal offences or an act causing the death of a person with criminal intent, in a coordinated or organised manner, the commission must recommend that the Government of Nepal immediately release the person from custody or detention, and withdraw the cases filed against them.

- 2.2. All relevant bodies of the Government of Nepal must make prompt arrangements to implement the recommendations provided by the Commission under the aforementioned clause.
- 2.3. No one shall be investigated or prosecuted for criminal offences solely for participating in activities related to this people's movement.
- 2.4. The Government of Nepal will establish a separate body to investigate instances of unjust and unlawful use of force by security agencies during this movement and in other movements in Nepal. This body will identify and analyse the causes of such actions, including shortcomings in existing laws, weaknesses within security agencies, and the lack of social and mental support for security personnel. It will also recommend necessary reforms to prevent the recurrence of such events. The report provided by this body will be made public, and its recommendations will be implemented immediately.

3. Ending political and policy corruption, depoliticisation of public institutions and partisan appointments

- 3.1. The Government of Nepal will form a high-level commission to end political, policy and institutional corruption and the practice of appointments to public institutions based on party affiliation. This commission will study, investigate, and recommend reforms regarding the following issues:
 - a. Procedures to take legal action against all persons appointed, elected to, or nominated to public office based on inconsistency between sources of income and their lifestyle and accumulation of wealth,
 - b. Legal and policy reforms required and necessary implementary measures for existing policies and laws to

end party-affiliation-based allocation and appointments to public offices,

- c. Investigate activities and financial records of bodies, including funds, trusts, councils, and centres, established in the name of persons who have held public offices using public land, property, and funds. If found operating illegally or against public interest, recommend dissolution and nationalisation of their assets,
- d. Study matters related to eliminating irregularities and corruption in Nepal's public bodies, reforms in bureaucratic structures, increasing and improving access to public service delivery, complaint redress mechanisms, and promoting e-governance.

4. Ensuring free, fair, peaceful and secure elections

4.1. The Government of Nepal will develop necessary legal, technical and institutional infrastructure and prioritise its implementation to ensure that the upcoming House of Representatives and all level elections are free, fair, peaceful, accessible, and secure.

4.2. Voter registration mechanisms for eligible Nepali citizens will be made accessible, convenient, and effective. Voters temporarily residing in other districts or in inter-constituency areas will be allowed to vote from the district they are currently residing in for the upcoming election. Arrangements to develop the necessary policy, legal and institutional infrastructure will commence to ensure voting rights for Nepali migrant workers, formally and informally employed in various countries, Nepali professionals abroad, and Nepali students studying abroad.

4.3. Prior to the nomination of candidates, relevant laws will be revised to require candidates to declare their assets and both political

parties and candidates to declare their campaign-related financial activities.

4.4. The assets and financial sources of all political parties will be mandatorily retrieved and investigated by relevant authorities, and assets with unverified sources will be nationalised, with legal arrangements made to hold those guilty criminally responsible.

4.5. In addition to the above for election system reform, the following arrangements will be immediately enacted through the amendment of existing laws:

- a. A “None of the Above (NOTA)” option will be included in the ballot.
- b. Legal provisions will be made so that only candidates selected through mandatory primary elections within political parties may run as candidates in the election.
- c. The Election Commission will use a lottery system to determine the order of parties/candidates on the ballot.
- d. A political party chairperson or president shall be allowed to serve only a maximum of two terms.
- e. Legal provisions will be made to control unhealthy coalitions that are formed only for electoral purposes.
- f. Legal arrangements will be made to oblige parties to comply with the principles of proportional inclusion when selecting candidates for election through the First Past the Post System in the upcoming elections.

5. Reforms to be made in the Constitution of Nepal

5.1. The Government of Nepal will form a high-level “Constitutional Amendment Reform Commission” comprising independent experts and stakeholders including Gen Z and youth, to identify,

study and analyze constitutional, legal and institutional reforms required to preserve the fundamental values and principles guaranteed by the Constitution of Nepal, including sovereignty, territorial integrity, national unity, proportionality, inclusivity and participatory principles, competitive federal democratic republican multiparty system, secularism, civic freedoms, fundamental rights, adult suffrage, periodic elections, freedom of the press, an independent, impartial and capable judiciary, and the rule of law, among others. This commission will prepare a recommendatory report for progressive change to maintain good governance, deliver socio-economic transformation and equitable prosperity through effective implementation of the Constitution, and fulfil the promises of sustainable peace and development, and to reflect the changing collective aspirations of the Nepali people.

5.2. This commission will prepare its report through nationwide debates, dialogues, discussions, and civic consultations at local, provincial and federal levels.

5.3. In addition to other matters, the commission's mandate will include the following subjects:

- a. Conduct a ten-year review of constitutional implementation, identify achievements and shortcomings and provide concrete suggestions to enhance implementation effectiveness,
- b. Recommend mechanisms to maintain good governance, prevent abuse of power and corruption, eliminate conflicts of interest, make constitutional implementation effective and review the collective aspirations of the Nepali people in a changing context and propose timely constitutional amendments,
- c. Recommend mechanisms to grant constitutional status to the commission mentioned in Clause 1.3,

- d. Consolidate outcomes of debates, dialogues, discussions, and civic consultations at local, provincial, and federal levels, regarding the structure of the Federal Parliament and Provincial Assemblies, and submit a recommendatory report upon studying, in addition to other issues, the following:
- (1) Necessary reforms in the electoral system to ensure full proportional and inclusive representation based on population,
 - (2) Corrective arrangements to ensure maximum reparative, rightful, and meaningful representation for women, Dalit, indigenous nationalities, Madhesi, Tharu, Muslims, backward classes, minorities, marginalised groups, persons with disabilities, communities identifying with diverse gender and sexual identities, farmers, workers, citizens from oppressed or backward regions, and economically disadvantaged Khas Arya,
 - (3) Limiting the tenure of the Head of State, executive heads at all three levels of government, and members of the Council of Ministers to two full terms, ensuring executive tenures do not exceed 10 years,
 - (4) Setting the minimum age to run as a candidate for the House of Representatives, Provincial Assembly, and Local level at 21 years,
 - (5) Institutional reforms required to prevent political and partisan interference and influence over the judiciary, Constitutional Council, constitutional commissions and Judicial Council, enabling them to function autonomously and independently, and ensure youth representation and participation in aforementioned public bodies,

- (6) Reforms required to ensure that political parties maintain internal inclusion and democracy.

6. Full proportional inclusion and participatory representation

6.1. Mechanisms established under this Agreement shall ensure inclusion to the fullest extent possible. The Gen Z Council formed under this Agreement will be established as an advisory body to all state mechanisms to ensure representation based on the principle of maximum reparative, rightful, and meaningful representation for women, Dalits, indigenous nationalities, Madhesi, Tharu, Muslims, backward classes, minorities, marginalized groups, persons with disabilities, communities identifying with diverse gender and sexual orientations, farmers, workers, citizens from oppressed or backward regions, and economically disadvantaged Khas Arya, etc., in state mechanisms.

7. Transparency

7.1. The Government of Nepal shall make necessary amendments and reforms in relevant laws, procedures, processes, technologies and mechanisms to ensure transparency and accountability in all governmental operations, decisions and expenditures. Accessibility to such government decisions and actions shall be ensured through the means of information boards, websites, social media and commonly used information and communication media, among others.

7.2. All reports of inquiry and investigation commissions previously formed in Nepal to study or investigate human rights violations, incidents of violence and corruption shall, subject to existing law, be made public.

7.3. The Government of Nepal will ensure equal opportunity, and end nepotism, patronage and discrimination to ensure a transparent, competitive and credible selection process for all appointments to public offices by adopting necessary measures in consultation with Gen Z and relevant stakeholders.

8. Freedom of expression and digital freedom

8.1. The Government of Nepal will arrange for necessary legal, physical and technical infrastructure to prevent any arbitrary, unlawful regulation, prohibition or prejudiced censorship of expression, information, communication and discourses on the internet and digital media.

8.2. The Government of Nepal will arrange for necessary legal, physical and technical reforms, and infrastructure will be provided to prevent unlawful surveillance and misuse of citizens' digital data by the state or third parties.

9. Formation of the Gen Z Council

9.1. A Gen Z Council will be formed to institutionalise the spirit and essence of the people's movement by participating in governance, ensuring accountability, advising, supporting, and cooperating with the government to ensure sustainable development and prosperity.

10. Effective date and implementation of the Agreement

10.1. This Agreement shall come into effect from the date it is signed by representatives of both parties.

10.2. This Agreement shall be implemented by mutual agreement between the Government of Nepal and the representatives of the Gen Z people's movement.

10.3. Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent either party from entering into subsequent agreements by mutual consent.

On Behalf of the Gen Z Representatives of the People's Movement:

Bhoj Bikram Thapa and 142 Representatives

On Behalf of the Government of Nepal: Sushila Karki, Prime
Minister

About DRCN

Established in 2014, Democracy Resource Center Nepal (DRCN) is a national non-governmental organization that conducts research on social and political issues. Since its establishment, the organization has conducted field-based and fact-based research on issues such as the process of implementing federalism in Nepal's transitional politics, local level restructuring, and election observation. DRCN has been presenting the findings of its research with stakeholders, and also conducting discussions and debates. DRCN's goal is to promote effective governance under Nepal's federal structure through such research and debates.

Following the Gen Z people's movement of September 8-9, 2025, a historic 10-point agreement was reached between the interim government and representatives of the movement on December 10, 2025. This agreement carried detailed commitments ranging from justice and institutional reform to constitutional amendment and an inclusive electoral system. What decisions did the interim government make to implement these commitments? Were actions taken in line with those decisions, or not? And to what extent did they align with the objectives of the agreement? This report, *Interim Government Decisions And Actions In Relation To The Gen Z–Government Agreement*, provides a factual examination of these questions.

This study by the Democracy Resource Center Nepal (DRCN) assesses the achievements, limitations, and challenges of the agreement's implementation, based on Council of Ministers' decisions, government actions, relevant legal and policy documents, and interviews with stakeholders. Drawing lessons from this experience of transitional governance, the report offers useful recommendations for the elected government, political parties, Gen Z groups, and civil society. It will be useful for policymakers, researchers, journalists, and all those interested in inclusive and accountable governance.



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